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INTRODUCTION
During “Superstorm” Sandy in 2012, New York University’s
Langone Medical Center lost power when its auxiliary generator
malfunctioned. 1 At the height of the hurricane emergency, hospital
staff sprang into action. In some cases, the staff hand-pumped oxygen
into patients until they could be transported by ambulance to other
facilities. 2 Ultimately, all 215 patients were evacuated from the
hospital. 3 After the storm subsided, questions lingered about why
Langone’s back-up generators failed to function properly. 4 Ensuring
that generators work is, after all, a safety best practice and a key
element of disaster preparation for hospitals. 5
Failing to have a reliable backup power source for a medical
facility responsible for the care of critically ill patients is an example
of a design flaw: a mistake or weakness in the way something or some
process was designed. The generators at Langone were a single point
of failure — a non-redundant part of a system whose failure will cause
the entire system to shut down. 6
This Article contends there is a design flaw in our current
democratic system that similarly contains too few fail-safes and
undermines a critical aspect of our policymaking infrastructure, i.e.
the resources, personnel, and authority to enforce the laws we have
passed as a polity. Like a hospital without a generator, an airplane
with only one engine, an IT system with compromised critical
hardware, or a large city with only one two-lane road out of town,
1. Alexandra Sifferlin, Lessons from Storm Sandy: When Hospital Generators
Fail, TIME (Oct. 30, 2012) http://healthland.time.com/2012/10/30/lessons-from-storm-

sandy-when-hospital-generators-fail/ [https://perma.cc/BNW2-2HHB].
2. Charles Ornstein, Why Do Hospital Generators Keep Failing?, PROPUBLICA
(Oct. 31, 2012, 4:53 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-do-hospitalsgenerators-keep-failing [https://perma.cc/A4D7-BQ69].
3. J. David Goodman & Colin Moynihan, Patients Evacuated from NYU
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
30,
2012),
Langone
After
Power
Failure,
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/nyregion/patients-evacuated-from-nyu-langoneafter-power-failure.html [https://nyti.ms/2yWnTAR].
4. Id.; see also What Caused Generators to Fail at NYC Hospitals, CBS/AP
(Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-caused-generators-to-fail-at-nychospitals/ [https://perma.cc/4KXZ-P3YX].
5. Sifferlin, supra note 1. Jim Mandler, Assistant Vice President for Public
Affairs of Continnum Health Partners, commented on the Hurricane Sandy response,
saying, “Whenever there is an anticipated event, even if remote, we always make sure
the generators are fully fueled and ready to go for at least several days.” Id.
6. Steven Vigeant, How to Find (and Eliminate) Single Points of Failure, DATA
EVOLUTION’S IT EXPERTS BLOG (May 22, 2015, 2:10 PM), https://www.dataev.com/itexperts-blog/how-to-find-and-eliminate-single-points-of-failure
[https://perma.cc/XY4Q-QESP].
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concentrating the infrastructure for enforcing our rights in one level
of government leaves residents vulnerable to underenforcement when
extralegal forces — elections, budgetary challenges, and competing
priorities — reduce the function of that governmental body.
Much of the scholarship on the role of cities begins, as one might
expect, by looking at municipalities themselves. 7 The existing
scholarship analyzes the unique powers of municipalities, the legal
limitations of city authority, and the comparative role of cities in our
federal system. 8 These critical issues are essential to understanding

7. Throughout this Article, we refer to cities, counties, and municipalities
interchangeably.
8. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II – Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 354 (1990) (“[M]unicipalities have considerable de
facto power to frame local policies and pursue local goals.”); David Schleicher, The
City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1547 (2010)
(contending that a municipal “corporation” possesses three powers: (1) those
expressly granted to it, (2) those necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the
powers expressly granted, and (3) those essential or indispensable to the purposes of
the corporation); see also, e.g., Paul Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action,
64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1121–29 (2012) (discussing the limitations of the subject-based
private law exception); Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak
Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542,
2545 (2006) (stating cities have limited power in the American political system); Rich
Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. &
POL. 147, 178 (2005) (“When states and localities disagree, federalism and localism
are conceptually incompatible, and federalism, more often than not, wins.”). On
comparative role of cities in our federal system, see, e.g., Kathleen Morris, The Case
for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (“In
the period between 1889 and 1900, the Court issued a series of opinions that
zigzagged between addressing state/local constitutional conflicts on the merits
without discussing the status of local governments and slowly but surely moving
towards a comprehensive federal doctrine of local governmental powerlessness.”);
Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619,
1622 (2008) (discussing local governments’ increased interest in affecting immigration
policy); Nestor Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2007) (“The prevailing view of
local government identity in federal law is one of fundamental powerlessness, with
localities at the whim of states’ plenary authority. In a lesser-recognized tradition,
however, courts have allowed local governments to invoke federal authority to resist
assertions of state power.”); Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General

Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection
Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 55–65 (2011) (analyzing federal statutes that
authorize concurrent state enforcement); Paul Diller, Re-Orienting Home Rule: Part
I – The Urban Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045,

1047–48 (2017) (highlighting that “cities are addressing subjects or using modes of
regulation that are not unique to local government” as a part of their growing
activism); Heather Gerken & Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009) (discussing the federal government’s dependence on
local authorities to administer federal programs); David Schleicher, Federalism and
State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 815 (2016) (“The very things that make
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the formal power of cities and the relative merits of limitations on
those powers. We approach our analysis, however, from a different
perspective. We do not start with cities at all. We begin by focusing
on a basic, functional question: How do we design an effective system
that adequately enforces the laws of our democracy, protecting all
members of our communities? How can we make the laws developed
through the legislative process at all levels of government a reality for
those they were written to protect? Put another way, how do we fully
effectuate the democratic process?
Law is the language society uses to document and communicate the
rules of our democratic system. Our laws express our values as a
community and the will of the People through their representatives. 9
Laws prohibit myriad behaviors that harm our communities and that
we, as a society, have decided should be impermissible:
predatory
lending, 11
and
environmental
discrimination, 10
12
despoliation, for example. Having laws on the books provides a
deterrent against illegal behavior. But, prohibitions only go so far.
Civil law enforcement is essential if our policies are to be a reality for
the communities they protect. If the laws passed by our elected
representatives are legitimate, we should view enforcement as a
necessary corollary to legislative policymaking to ensure compliance
with those laws. Indeed, when our laws go unenforced, our
democracy cannot function properly.
In practice, however, our communities do not currently receive the
full benefit of the laws written to protect them due to at least three

partisan federalism work may prevent smaller national minorities from using local
power to affect national discussions.”).
9. See Yehezkel Dror, Values and the Law, 17 ANTIOCH REV. 440, 440 (1957)
(“One of the more important repositories and expressions of the values of any society
is its law . . . These legal norms are closely related to various social values, being
either direct expression of them or serving them in a more indirect way.”); Philip
Sales, Judges and the Legislature: Values into Law, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 287, 290
(2012) (considering the ways in which the legislature and the judiciary give expression
to political and moral values by noting that “the cardinal [rule] of democracy, of
course, is that it provides a practical mechanism of control of the rulers by the
ruled . . . And hence a safeguard against tyranny and arbitrary rule and motive for the
rulers to seek to promote and respect the interests of the ruled”).
10. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I–X, XIII–XV, IXX; Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12101–12103 (2009); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (1968).
11. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ch. 2 §§ 41–58 (2006);
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 12 CFR 226.32; Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1968).
12. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1977); Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1974).
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phenomena described in this Article. 13 First, our laws are underenforced, and this “enforcement gap” means that many legal
violations go undetected and unaddressed, undermining the force of
those laws to regulate conduct in the workplace, marketplace, and
broader community. 14 Second, the Trump administration has pulled
back on its enforcement of key public rights. 15 Not only have leaders
of prominent federal agencies expressed their intention to be less
aggressive in fulfilling their roles as protectors of civil, economic, and
environmental rights, but many have articulated and demonstrated an
outright hostility to those protections. 16 Third, the power of private

13. A full exposition of the legal and political dynamics underpinning these three
trends is outside the scope of this Article.
14. See, e.g., Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and
Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1904–05 (2013);
see Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 659–60 (2012) (discussing
how the erosion of class action certifications and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau have led to an enforcement gap for consumer protection, antitrust, and
employment violations that should be addressed by state attorneys general using
their parens patrie authority); see also Suzette Malveaux, The Modern Class Action
Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance Today, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 379–80
(2017) (noting that increased use of arbitration agreements “does a disservice to
those individuals seeking to use the civil rights provision of the modern class action
rule,” leading to “less enforcement in the cases where it is needed the most”).
15. See Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump Is Rolling Back Obama’s
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
20,
2018),
Legacy,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-rolling-back-obamarules/?utm_term=.5cc8cde4fb41 [https://perma.cc/Y74H-5VSF] (reporting that, as of
January 20, 2018, the Trump administration had canceled 130 rules and regulations
within the topics of the environment, labor and finance, health care, civil rights,
worker and consumer safety, government reform, immigration, and education); see
also Juliet Eilperin et al., Trump Administration Plans to Minimize Civil Rights
WASH.
POST
(May
29,
2017),
Efforts
in
Agencies,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-administration-plans-to-minimizecivil-rights-efforts-in-agencies/2017/05/29/922fc1b2-39a7-11e7-a058ddbb23c75d82_story.html?utm_term=.f51cf022aea2 [https://perma.cc/XYB3-SH2P]
(discussing the Trump administration’s cuts to staffers of the Education
Department’s Office of Civil Rights, termination of enforcement of consent decrees
with police departments, and plan to disband the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs that has monitored discrimination among federal contractors).
16. See, e.g., Erica Green, DeVos Education Dept. Begins Dismissing Civil Rights
Cases in the Name of Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/us/politics/devos-education-department-civilrights.html [https://nyti.ms/2Hf9jdU] (“The Education Department’s Office for Civil
Rights has begun dismissing hundreds of civil rights complaints under a new protocol
that allows investigators to disregard cases that are part of serial filings or that they
consider burdensome to the office.”); Alan Rappeport, Mick Mulvaney, Consumer
Bureau’s Chief, Urges Congress to Cripple Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/us/politics/cfpb-mick-mulvaney.html
[https://nyti.ms/2Gwm7MI] (“In his first report to Congress as the acting director of
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litigants to vindicate their own rights in court has been diminished;
over the past decade, constriction of laws related to class-action
lawsuits and the increased acceptance of mandatory arbitration
clauses and class-action waivers have left individuals who experience
harm in the workplace or at the hands of an unscrupulous company
without much meaningful recourse. 17
The confluence of these three trends exposes a design flaw in our
current democratic system. Laws are under-enforced, and two of the
actors previously well-situated to enforce the rights enshrined in those
laws are either inactive or blocked. As a result, our most vulnerable
communities are without defenders, the extent of their protections
drastically cut as a result of one federal election. This design flaw has
both functional and theoretical effects.
From a functional
perspective, it subjects people to real-life harm and loss of wages,
employment, capital, housing, and other necessities of modern life,
even when the conduct that caused those losses is contrary to existing
law. 18 From the perspective of democratic theory and norms, it
undermines the legitimacy of institutions charged with representing
the will of the People through rule of law when those laws lack reallife effect.
This Article argues that a system with built-in redundancy and
diversification by design, in which every level of government is ready
and able to enforce our core rights and freedoms, would resolve this
design flaw and yield both practical and theoretical benefits. We
present city affirmative litigation as a critical component of this
framework. Our proposed solution to this design flaw would
incorporate two concepts: redundancy and diversification.
By
redundancy, we mean that an effective system should have more than
a single point of failure. Given the importance of enforcement as a
means of effectuating duly-enacted policy and fulfilling the

the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Mick Mulvaney called on lawmakers on
Monday to cripple the agency that he has been temporarily tasked with overseeing.”);
Coral Davenport, Scott Pruitt, Under Fire, Plans to Initiate a Big Environmental
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
14,
2018),
Rollback,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/climate/pruitt-clean-air-water-rollbacks.html
[https://nyti.ms/2HOi2zd] (“Mr. Pruitt has initiated the rollback of dozens of
environmental rules over the past year and a half.”).
17. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 658–60; Malveaux, supra note 14, at
376–79; see also Joanna Pearl, As SCOTUS Abandons Workers, States, Cities Must
NAT’L
L.
J.
(June
7,
2018,
3:06
PM),
Fill
Void,
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/06/07/as-scotus-abandons-workersstates-cities-must-fill-void/?slreturn=20180624035731 [https://perma.cc/4TJ7-8RVU]
(discussing the effects of Epic Systems decision on modern employment rights).
18. See infra Section I.A.
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representational values of a democracy, redundancy by design would
ensure that no one agency or election could offline enforcement
entirely. By diversification, we mean that an effective system should
have a diversified set of enforcers to allow for effective resolution of
the numerous and complex problems presented by law violations.
Additionally, because “the People” can mean different things
depending on a district or state’s boundaries, diversification would
ensure that different majorities can set different priorities for
enforcement.
Increased city engagement in enforcing public rights laws is an
important and under-utilized solution that incorporates both concepts
of redundancy and diversification. 19 Cities should have the ability to
be enforcers and protectors of their communities by investigating
legal violations and filing lawsuits. Increasing affirmative litigation by
cities is a necessary and desirable response to a design flaw that
concentrates too many enforcement resources in one level of
government.
Part I describes the three above-listed trends in three sections: Part
I.A articulates the need for enforcement as a critical step in policy
making efforts and discusses the gap between the laws on the books
and the lived realities of many people those laws are written to serve
(the so-called “enforcement gap”). Part I.B addresses the role of the
federal government as a dominant government enforcer of our core
rights and protections and highlights the ways in which the current
administration has abdicated that role. Part I.C outlines the legal
19. We acknowledge that states also have the ability to enforce laws that protect
the rights of their communities. Indeed, many have been and continue to be leaders
in rights enforcement across a wide variety of issues. Complaint, California v. Heald
Coll., No. CGC-13-534793 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 10, 2013); Complaint, New York v.
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 400016/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 14. 2018); Mark L.
Earley, Special Solicitude: The Growing Power of State Attorneys General, 52 U.
RICH. L. REV. 561 (2018); Mark Totten, The Rise of State Attorneys General a Boon
to Democracy, HILL, (July 6, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/state-local-politics/340841-the-rise-of-the-state-attorney-generals-is-boon-to
[https://perma.cc/QL6K-UVTN]; see generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007); Complaint, Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 29,
2017). Although a full discussion of the role of states is outside the scope of this
Article, we believe that state-level engagement — by attorneys general and state
regulatory bodies, for example — is critical to protecting the rights of our most
vulnerable communities. We focus on cities for the purpose of this Article because
they are under-explored relative to State actors in a system. As we note infra Part II,
state attorneys general offer additional opportunities to diversify enforcement from
the federal government. We do not argue that cities should supplant states as the
only or primary enforcer in addition to the federal government. Rather, we highlight
cities as an under-utilized opportunity for redundancy and diversification in rights
enforcement.
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limitations on private enforcement and the practical impact of WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 20 and AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion 21 and their progeny on rights enforcement. Part II
proposes affirmative litigation by cities as one viable solution to the
confluence of factors operating to weaken protections under the law.
The concepts of redundancy and diversification offer compelling
rationales for increased city affirmative litigation as a design solution
to ensure better effectuation of thePeople’s policy choices through
their representatives. Moreover, cities should have an active role in
rights enforcement at all times, not just in response to the current
crisis. 22
I. THE DESIGN FLAW: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL BARRIERS
TO ENFORCEMENT
As mentioned above, our current government contains a
fundamental design flaw where one point of failure exposes the entire
system and leaves the People vulnerable and defenseless. This Part
describes three phenomena that prevents those in need of the full
protection of law from obtaining the enforcement sought and entitled.
This Part proceeds in the three sections: Part I.A addresses the need
for enforcement as a critical step in policy making efforts and
elaborates on the reputed enforcement gap widening between written
law and those people the laws were written to protect. Part I.B
discusses federal government’s role as a primary enforcer of our
rights and protections and emphasizes the ways in which the current
administration has failed to fulfill its duties. Part I.C discusses the
frameworks of recent precedential class action litigation and explains
their legal implications on the private enforcement of rights.
A. Rights Require Enforcement: The Enforcement Gap and Its
Impact
Despite the attention new legislation receives in the press and
among advocates of all ideologies, once passed, laws protecting our
rights to fair treatment in the workplace, marketplace, and
community are chronically under-enforced. When compared to the
front-end inputs of policymaking — candidate and ballot measure

20. 564 U.S. 338, 356 (2011).
21. 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
22. Although affirmative litigation by cities is one solution to strengthen rights
enforcement, it is not the only one. Though not discussed in this Article, one
example is the role that states play in enforcing the rights of our communities.
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campaigns, legislative proposals, and lobbying — the government has
underinvested in the back-end enforcement needed to realize those
laws, leaving community members vulnerable.
Scholars and practitioners across academic disciplines have
identified many causes 23 of this enforcement gap – including underinvestment and industry capture — but there is little debate that the
gap exists. 24 The gap persists throughout government, from the
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and beyond. 25
This enforcement gap creates a critical hole in the policymaking
process and blunts the effect of otherwise-strong laws. Getting laws
through the legislative process is a necessary but insufficient
component of policymaking. However, without implementation and
enforcement, the intent of legislation may never be realized. For
example, if a state were to pass a minimum wage law, but no one
checks whether companies in fact pay the minimum wage nor are
there any consequences to failure to pay such a wage, the majority of
workers likely would not receive the benefit of the new law. Across
the ten most populous states in the country, wage theft deprives
approximately 2.4 million workers of $8 billion per year, with a direct

23. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 14 (“The problem is not a lack of good law . . . .
[T]he problem is that due to insufficient funding and staffing, industry capture, or
some combination of both, these potentially powerful bodies of consumer protection
law are woefully under-enforced.”); see also supra notes 15–18 and infra note 105.
24. “For several decades, scholars and policy experts have pointed out the
enormous gaps in consumer protection enforcement, and called for a more effective
approach.” Morris, supra note 14, at 1906–07 (surveying analysis of consumer
protections and calls for increased enforcement); see also Kathleen S. Morris, Cities
Seeking Justice: Local Government Litigation in Public Interest, in HOW CITIES WILL
SAVE THE WORLD 189 (Ray Brescia & John T. Marshall eds., 2016) (“[C]ivil laws in
the U.S., particularly those that most directly impact the corporate bottom line —
such as consumer protection, environmental health, wage-and-hour, and industrial
safety regulations — are dangerously under-enforced.”).
25. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 67 (2010) (identifying the chronic
underfunding and understaffing of the Consumer Products Safety Commission as a
cause of the agency’s having “fallen far short of its statutory mandate”); Myriam E.
Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1409–10 (2000) (linking
insufficient staffing to the Department of Justice’s inability to investigate and detect
unconstitutional police practices); David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain?
Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59 (2006) (noting that, “[b]ecause of limitations in available
resources in many agencies, and the often-politicized environment surrounding
regulatory decisions, complaint activities have become in many cases the primary
driver of enforcement activity” but that, empirically, “there is a significant gap
between the level of complaint activity and underlying violation rates”).
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impact on the poverty rate. 26 In California, for example, a recent
report by the Economic Policy Institute found that minimum wage
violations increased poverty rates among workers who experienced
wage theft by nearly twenty-three percent. 27 In addition, honest
businesses that pay the required minimum wage suffer from unfair
competition by their rival companies, which can offer lower prices
due to their illegally-reduced costs. 28 Further, ensuring that policies
are implemented and enforced reduces the need for additional policy
and lawmaking and informs smarter, more efficient future policy
making efforts by road-testing existing laws to see how well they work
in protecting people from harm. In other words, enforcement is
essential both to effectuate current policy and to inform future
policy. 29
B.

Rights Require Enforcers: The Absentee Federal Government

The federal government plays a critical role in enforcing civil
rights, economic protections, and environmental laws that protect our
communities. The current federal administration, including the DOJ
and other federal agencies, have retreated from this role, meaning
that fewer enforcers are focused on protecting the rights and
freedoms that define us as Americans. 30
The nation’s chief law enforcement agency, the DOJ is composed
of 115,760 employees, ten percent of whom are attorneys, organized
in forty separate component organizations nationwide. 31 The DOJ is

26. DAVID COOPER & TERESA KROEGER, ECON. POLICY INST., EMPLOYERS
STEAL BILLIONS FROM WORKERS PAYCHECKS EACH YEAR 1 (May 10, 2017),
https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paycheckseach-year-survey-data-show-millions-of-workers-are-paid-less-than-the-minimumwage-at-significant-cost-to-taxpayers-and-state-economies/ [https://perma.cc/GR5C6EQV].
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 29; see also About Wage Theft, SMART CITIES PREVAIL,
https://www.smartcitiesprevail.org/about-wage-theft/ [https://perma.cc/4U5K-UQFJ].
29. Agencies frequently use their law enforcement experiences to inform
policymaking. For example, in promulgating the Telemarketing Sales Rule, the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission incorporated its previous law enforcement cases into the
rulemaking record and noted: “The record, as well as the Commission’s own law
enforcement experience and that of its state and federal counterparts, supports the
Commission’s view that the anti-fraud amendments to the TSR are necessary and
appropriate to protect consumers from significant financial harm.” 80 Fed. Reg.
77525 (Dec. 14, 2015) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 310).
30. See infra note 35.
31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2017 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT I-3, I-6 (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/doj/page/file/1012276/download#introduction
[https://perma.cc/HA9M-PEZB].
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responsible for policing domestic terrorism, curbing insider trading
and monopolies, addressing violations of tax laws, protecting the
environment, and enforcing every major piece of federal civil rights
legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 32
The current DOJ, however, has retreated from many of these
critical responsibilities, leading former DOJ administrators and
legislators to fear that current Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, is
rolling back civil rights. 33 While the extent and nature of federal
enforcement necessarily varies over time and from administration to
administration, 34 the hostility of the current federal government to

32. Id. at I-3 (“The Department’s litigating divisions represent the rights and
interests of the American people and enforce federal criminal and civil laws. The
litigating divisions are comprised of the Antitrust (ATR), Civil (CIV), Civil Rights
(CRT), Criminal (CRM), Environment and Natural Resources (ENRD), and Tax
(TAX) Divisions. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the Office on Violence
Against Women (OVW), and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) provide leadership and assistance to state, local, and tribal governments.”).
33. See Ryan J. Reilly, Exclusive: Here’s Jeff Sessions’ Draft Master Plan for the
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
9,
2018),
Justice
Department,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/doj-trump-strategic-plan-civilrights_us_5a7120c6e4b0a6aa487457b9 [https://perma.cc/S2NZ-E3AE] (describing the
anti-civil rights agenda of the DOJ under Attorney General Jeff Sessions and how
that agenda is articulated in the Department’s strategic plan. Vanita Gupta, who
previously lead the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, said: “I suppose they don’t have the
item that says ‘roll back civil rights progress’ on their strategic plan, which has been
what they’ve been doing . . . Frankly they should’ve added that to the list.”); see also
Carrie Johnson, In His First Year as Attorney General, Sessions Transforms Justice
in Key Ways, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 9, 2018, 4:52 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/09/583698634/in-his-first-year-as-attorney-generalsessions-transforms-justice-in-key-ways [https://perma.cc/6P3D-KDPT] (discussing
how in its first year, the Justice Department rescinded guidance for schools that was
designed to protect transgender students in bathrooms and locker rooms, issued legal
briefs arguing that the 1964 civil rights law did not bar discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, turned the civil rights unit away from investigating patterns of
excessive force and racial profiling by local law enforcement, and stated that the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program was “an unconstitutional
exercise of authority by the executive branch”).
34. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 16 (“The Obama administration’s regulation
took a wide view of how far the federal government could go in its effort to protect
waters; Mr. Trump directed Mr. Pruitt to take a far narrower view of the law.”); see
generally Gabriel Florit, 40 Years of Budgets Show Shifting National Priorities,
POST
(Mar.
17,
2017),
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/budgethistory/?utm_term=.b00baeb55f63 [https://perma.cc/ME99-BD28] (discussing how
presidential administrations have constructed different discretionary spending limits
with respect to agencies and programs in their budget proposals).
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protecting these essential rights is striking, 35 exacerbating the
enforcement gap described in Part I.A. The DOJ’s articulated
priorities, for example, no longer include civil rights enforcement,
replacing it with a focus on “counterterrorism; securing the borders
and enhancing immigration enforcement; reducing violent crime; and
promoting ‘integrity, good government and the rule of law.’” 36 The
DOJ’s budget requests are consistent with these statements, outlining
plans to pour resources into immigration and “rule of law” initiatives,
while consolidating offices within the Civil Rights Division.37 The
NAACP, along with a coalition of other prominent civil rights
organizations, recently sent a letter to the Attorney General decrying
the DOJ’s failure to include civil rights among its priorities and the
Department’s actions under his leadership, which, taken together,
make “explicit” the Attorney General’s “intention to abandon one of
the most important imperatives of the Department . . . .” 38

35. Sherrilyn Ifill, President Trump’s First Year Was an Affront to Civil Rights,
TIME (Jan. 17, 2018), http://time.com/5106648/donald-trump-civil-rights-race/
[https://perma.cc/9TTP-Y4S4] (“In his first year leading the DOJ, Attorney General
Jeff Sessions may have lost the confidence of the President, but that hasn’t stopped
the nation’s top law enforcement officer from declining to enforce the law whenever
civil rights and communities of color are under attack.”); Rob Arthur, Trump’s
Justice Dep’t Isn’t Enforcing Civil Rights, VICE (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/wj44y4/trumps-justice-department-isnt-enforcingcivil-rights [https://perma.cc/Q5H4-BBMW] (“The Trump administration is pursuing
far fewer civil rights cases than its predecessors, a VICE News review of Justice
Department records shows. Total activity in the agency’s civil rights division is at a
17-year low, falling well below levels seen in the last two administrations. One DOJ
section charged with enforcing laws on police department misconduct has been
completely inactive.”); Jesselyn McCurdy, The Justice Department Continues to Roll
Back Civil Rights Protections, ACLU (Nov. 20, 2017, 3:45 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/justice-department-continues-rollback-civil-rights-protections [https://perma.cc/7Y5S-ESPZ]; see also supra note 17.
36. See Reilly, supra note 33.
37. See, e.g., Pema Levy, Justice Dep’t Seeks More Funds for Law Enforcement
While Squeezing Civil Rights, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 12, 2018, 5:37 PM),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/02/justice-department-seeks-more-fundsfor-law-enforcement-while-squeezing-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/WH54-92LS]; Sari
Horwitz, Justice Dep’t’s $28 Billion Budget Reflects Sessions’s Priorities, WASH. Post
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justicedepartments-28-billion-budget-reflects-sessionss-priorities/2018/02/12/acb6a642-103211e8-9065-e55346f6de81_story.html?utm_term=.b14e3f0211b7
[http://perma.cc/XWE2-94NG].
38. Letter from Derrick Johnson et al., President and CEO, NAACP, to Jefferson
Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice, http://www.naacp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Letter-on-DOJ-Priorities-Final-002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JW5-DQHT] (“ . . . [Y]ou have taken actions that clearly
reflect . . . in some instances, affirmative hostility to the very civil rights protections
you are charged with enforcing. Under your leadership, the Department reversed its
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The DOJ has acted in large part consistently with its articulated
priorities. In March 2017, the Attorney General issued a memo
instructing Department officials to immediately review all
Department activities, including consent decrees previously reached
between the Civil Rights Division and local police departments, to
ensure they were consistent with the administration’s new goals.39
Days later, the DOJ requested that a federal court postpone the
implementation of its consent decree with the Baltimore Police
Department, causing civil rights advocates, law enforcement veterans,
and the officials responsible for putting the agreement in place to
express concern. 40 In early 2018, the administration effectively closed
the Office of Access to Justice, 41 whose mission was to encourage fair
and accessible outcomes in the justice system by increasing
availability of legal assistance to people who cannot afford
representation. 42
With respect to the Department’s new priorities, the DOJ has
taken steps to limit the rights of individuals. For example, the DOJ
has dispensed with many procedural protections that had been in

long-held position supporting our constitutional challenge to Texas’ voter ID law
notwithstanding a federal court’s ruling in our favor, rolled back federal policing
reform efforts, and expressed interest in relitigating the constitutionality of
affirmative action despite repeated Supreme Court rulings upholding it. Despite a
57% rise in hate crimes and our explicit request at our meeting that you speak out
unequivocally against hate crimes and commit increased resources to investigating
groups and individuals engaged in white supremacist violence, you have failed to
articulate any measures directly addressed to violent white extremism.”).
39. See Memorandum from the Office of the Att’y Gen. to Heads of Dep’t
Components
and
U.S.
Att’ys
(Mar.
31,
2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3535148-Consentdecreebaltimore.html
[https://perma.cc/D8Q3-BWG9]; see also Sari Horwitz et al., Sessions Orders Justice
Department to Review All Police Reform Agreements, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-orders-justicedepartment-to-review-all-police-reform-agreements/2017/04/03/ba934058-18bd-11e79887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.544db3d28052
[http://perma.cc/7RWLVGWQ].
40. See Horwitz et al., supra note 39.
41. Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Office to Make Legal Aid More Accessible Is
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
1,
2018),
Quietly
Closed,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/us/politics/office-of-access-to-justicedepartment-closed.html [https://nyti.ms/2GD7aVm].
42. See Mission, OFFICE FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 8,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/atj [https://perma.cc/R2WF-N5GA] (“ATJ’s mission is
to help the justice system efficiently deliver outcomes that are fair and accessible to
all, irrespective of wealth and status. ATJ staff works within the Department of
Justice, across federal agencies, and with state, local, and tribal justice system
stakeholders to increase access to counsel and legal assistance and to improve the
justice delivery systems that serve people who are unable to afford lawyers.”).
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place for participants in the immigration system. 43 In March 2018, the
Attorney General announced the elimination of a requirement that
asylum seekers get a full hearing before an immigration judge if the
judge believes that the claims are fraudulent or unlikely to succeed.44
Beginning in October 2018, immigration judges will be required to
speed up their processing of cases to receive satisfactory ratings. 45 In
April 2018, Attorney General Sessions announced a new “zerotolerance policy” for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), which prohibits
illegal entry and attempted illegal entry into the United States.46

43. See Bea Bischoff, The Kris Kobach Playbook: Jeff Sessions Is Doing
Everything in His Power to Make Asylum-Seekers Suffer, SLATE (July 10, 2018, 3:50

PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/jeff-sessions-is-doing-everything-inhis-power-to-make-asylum-seekers-suffer.html
[https://perma.cc/78QN-YKET]
(“Without fanfare, Sessions managed to implement harsher guidelines for children
appearing in immigration court, limit the ability of immigration attorneys to seek
continuances, curtail immigrants’ ability to transfer their case to a court closer to
where they are living, and pack the immigration court benches with former ICE
attorneys.”); see also Russell Wheeler, Amid Turmoil on the Border, New DOJ
Policy Encourages Immigration Judges to Cut Corners, BROOKINGS: FIXGOV BLOG
(June 18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/18/amid-turmoil-onthe-border-new-doj-policy-encourages-immigration-judges-to-cut-corners
[https://perma.cc/3CVL-DCCP] (“In courts with more demanding caseloads, judges
will often face a choice: protect their economic well-being by cutting due process
corners or serve as independent adjudicators.”); Vann R. Newkirk II, The End of
ATLANTIC
(June
18,
2018),
Civil
Rights,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/sessions/563006/
[https://perma.cc/L34A-LRVW] (“Sessions has recently pushed for changes in the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the immigration-court system
embedded within the DOJ. He’s considering ways to force judges to process more
deportation cases, changes that several experts say will undoubtedly mean that fewer
people receive due process or fair hearings.”). See generally Memorandum from
James R. McHenry III, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to the Office of
the
Chief
Immigration
Judge
et
al.
(Jan.
17,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1026721/download
[https://perma.cc/7G6772RC]; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Announces ZeroTolerance
Policy
for
Criminal
Illegal
Entry
(Apr.
6,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1015996/download
[https://perma.cc/Z5SE-W6C7].
44. See, e.g., Antonio Olivo, Advocates Say Sessions’s Decision to Toss Rule on
Asylum Hearings Endangers Thousands, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/advocates-sessions-decision-totoss-rule-on-asylum-hearings-endangers-thousands/2018/03/07/24b63b24-2214-11e894da-ebf9d112159c_story.html?utm_term=.867f3dc4f6be
[http://perma.cc/L6QQ6SB8].
45. See, e.g., Willa Frej, DOJ Slaps Quotas on Immigration Judges to Speed
Deportations,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
3,
2018,
7:58
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/doj-quotas-on-immigration-judges-to-speeddeportations_us_5ac346cbe4b04646b645d061 [https://perma.cc/JEY2-MKY7].
46. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy
for Criminal Illegal Entry, supra note 43.
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Since the implementation of that policy, hundreds of children have
been separated from their parents at the U.S. border. 47
The DOJ is not alone. Other federal agencies charged with
protecting civil, economic, and environmental rights have similarly
abandoned their efforts to enforce these rights. The Department of
Education has scaled back investigations into civil rights violations at
public schools and universities, 48 sought less funding for civil rights
enforcement, 49 and removed protections for transgender students and
victims of sexual assault on campuses nationwide. 50 Similarly, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has historically “been
instrumental in setting policy priorities and writing and enforcing a
wide range of laws that have literally changed the face of the Earth
for the better.” 51 But, this administration’s EPA has sought to arrest
— if not to undo — much of this progress. The EPA Administrator
has called for revised, more permissive, emissions standards for cars
and trucks 52 and has loosened regulations on air pollution by
decreasing the penalties and corrective action required for companies

47. See Julia Ainsley & Jane C. Timm, 1,995 Children Separated from Families at
Border Under ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policy, NBC (June 15, 2018, 3:37 PM),

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/1-995-children-separated-familiesborder-under-zero-tolerance-policy-n883716 [https://perma.cc/98JW-JAV7].
48. See Erica L. Green, Education Dept. Says It Will Scale Back Civil Rights
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
16,
2017),
Investigations,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/politics/education-department-civil-rightsbetsy-devos.html [https://nyti.ms/2szkO7x].
49. See id. (“In the administration’s budget request for the fiscal year that begins
in October [2017], the Education Department has proposed cutting more than 40
staff positions from the office of civil rights . . . .”).
50. See, e.g., Cory Turner & Anya Kamenetz, The Education Department Says It
Won’t Act on Transgender Student Bathroom Access, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018, 5:39 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/02/12/585181704/the-education-departmentsays-it-wont-act-on-transgender-student-bathroom-access
[https://perma.cc/A8KPLKDV]; Stephanie Saul & Kate Taylor, Betsy DeVos Reverses Obama-Era Policy on
Campus Sexual Assault Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/us/devos-colleges-sexassault.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=5F670DE371F884B156C245B6A254BE
2B&gwt=pay [https://nyti.ms/2yiif9l].
51. Environmental Enforcer: How Effective Has the EPA Been in Its First 40
Years?, SCI. AM.: EARTHTALK, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-epafirst-40-years/ [https://perma.cc/5HQY-9Y2N].
52. Press Release, EPA, EPA Administrator Pruitt: GHG Emissions Standards
for Cars and Light Trucks Should Be Revised (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-administrator-pruitt-ghg-emissions-standardscars-and-light-trucks-should-be [https://perma.cc/VDG4-VUMV].
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found to be polluting. 53 The administration has also backed away
from efforts to stop or mitigate the effects of global climate change. 54
Similar retrenchment is evident in consumer protection
enforcement at the federal level. In the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2008, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) to provide increased accountability for enforcing
federal consumer financial laws and protecting consumers in the
financial marketplace. 55 During its first six years, the CFPB pursued
an ambitious enforcement agenda, bringing cases to address illegal,
predatory practices related to mortgages, debt collection, payday
loans, student loans, credit reporting, and deposit products. 56 In that
53. See, e.g., Memorandum from William L. Wehrum, Assistant Adm’r, Office of
Air & Radiation, EPA, to Reg’l Air Div. of Dirs. (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201801/documents/reclassification_of_major_sources_as_area_sources_under_section_112
_of_the_clean_air_act.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BP6-M3KR]; Michael Greshko et al., A
Running List of How President Trump Is Changing Environmental Policy, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 21, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/howtrump-is-changing-science-environment/ [https://perma.cc/RE7V-B5GS].
54. See, e.g., Greshko et al., supra note 53. Cf. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 22–23 (Dec. 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-20170905.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PV6-KG3U]; Richard Gonzales, FEMA Drops ‘Climate
NPR
(Mar.
15,
2018),
Change’
from
Its
Strategic
Plan,
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/15/594140026/fema-drops-climatechange-from-its-strategic-plan [https://perma.cc/3QZR-2GAP].
55. 12 U.S.C. §5491(a) (2010); About Us: The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/
[https://perma.cc/4THQ-XVDB].
56. See, e.g., Consent Order, In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2018BCFP-0001 (Apr. 20, 2018) (brought against Wells Fargo for improper mortgage
practices); CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 9:17-CV-80495, 2017 WL 1408216 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 20, 2017) (case brought against Owcen Financial Corporation for a
multitude of improper loan practices); CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101RDM, 2017 WL 191446 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (bringing suit against Navient for
improper servicing and collection of student loans); CFPB v. Final Judgment and
Order for Restitution, Disgorgement, a Civil Money Penalty, and Permanent
Injunction Against Defendant Stephen Lyster Siringoringo, No. an Individual, Also
D/B/A Siringoringo Law Firm, CFPB v. CFPB v. Siringoringo, No. 8:14-cv-01155-JVS
(AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017); Consent Order, In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 8, 2016); CFPB v. Cashcall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (bringing suit against
CashCall for improperly collecting loans that state-licensing and usury laws rendered
partially void or uncollectible); Consent Order, In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB
No. 2016-CFPB-0013 (Aug. 22, 2016); Consent Order, CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp.,
No. 13-cv-2025 (RMC), 2016 WL 1717364 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2016); Consent Order, In
re Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0028 (Oct. 29, 2015) (bringing suit
against General Information Services for improper credit reporting practices); CFPB
v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-07194, 2015 WL 10854380 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27,
2015) (bringing suit against Corinthian Colleges in violation of the Fair Debt
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time, the Bureau’s supervisory and enforcement work resulted in
orders of approximately $11.9 billion in relief to over 29 million
consumers across the U.S. 57
This approach changed dramatically in November 2017, when
President Trump appointed Mick Mulvaney Acting Director of the
CFPB. 58 Mulvaney, who also leads the Office of Management and
Budget, had been outspoken in his opposition to the CFPB and its
mission, calling the Bureau a “sick, sad joke.” 59 The Acting Director
subsequently took steps consistent with his articulated value of the
Bureau’s mission. He requested no funding from the Federal Reserve
for the second quarter of the 2018 Fiscal Year, 60 despite the fact that
the budget devoted to the Bureau’s enforcement efforts had not
decreased in the preceding years. 61 In February 2018, the Bureau

Collection Practices Act); CFPB v. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order with
Respect to CFPB v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
CFPB No. 1:15-cv-00179-RDB (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2015) (bringing suit against Wells
Fargo for improper loan collection practices); Consent Order, In re Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0002 (Jan. 22, 2015); Consent Order, In re ACE
Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (July 10, 2014) (bringing suit against
Ace Cash Express in connection with its collection of payday loans); CFPB v.
Cashcall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167 (GAO), 2014 WL 10321537 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2014)
(bringing suit against CashCall for improperly collecting loans that state laws
rendered void or limited the consumer’s obligation to repay).
57. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FACTSHEET, CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
BUREAU:
BY
THE
NUMBERS
(July
2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201707_cfpb_bythe-numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4PV-XS35].
58. Renae Merle, The CFPB Now Has Two Acting Directors. And Nobody
Knows Which One Should Lead the Federal Agency, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/11/24/the-cfpb-now-has-twoacting-directors-and-nobody-knows-which-one-should-lead-the-federalagency/?utm_term=.6a0092c3ee77 [https://perma.cc/P5SM-8DV4].
59. Victoria Guida, Trump Taps Mulvaney to Head CFPB, Sparking Confusion
over Agency’s Leadership, POLITICO (Nov. 24, 2017, 4:45 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/24/richard-cordray-successor-cfpb-leandraenglish-259612 [https://perma.cc/9SZM-2CUE].
60. Letter from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Protection
Bureau, to The Honorable Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve
Sys.
(Jan.
17,
2018),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fy2018_q2_funding-requestletter-to-frb.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG2R-KZZG].
61. The spending by the Bureau division that includes its enforcement function,
Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending, had steadily increased leading up to
Mulvaney’s assuming leadership. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE
FOR
THE
FOURTH
QUARTER
OF
FISCAL
YEAR
2012
(2012),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_CFO-Q4-Update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S2JA-V3ZU]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE FOR
THE
FOURTH
QUARTER
OF
FISCAL
YEAR
2013
(2013),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_cfo-q4-update.pdf
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issued an updated strategic plan that offers notably fewer specifics
and accountability metrics about its enforcement work than previous
iterations. 62 More recently, the Acting Director proposed dramatic
cuts to the Bureau’s authority. 63 He has also indicated a desire to
defer to other enforcers. 64 In practice, however, this approach has
resulted in inaction and retrenchment. The Bureau has brought eight
enforcement actions since the Acting Director was appointed in late
November 2017. 65 It dismissed a pending lawsuit it had previously
[https://perma.cc/4F2T-UXEK]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE FOR
THE
FOURTH
QUARTER
OF
FISCAL
YEAR
2014
(2014),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_cfo-quarterly-update_q4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TZ3R-F6RL]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE FOR
THE
FOURTH
QUARTER
OF
FISCAL
YEAR
2015
(2015),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201511_cfpb_cfo-quarterly-update_q4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JA34-W4BP]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE FOR
THE
FOURTH
QUARTER
OF
FISCAL
YEAR
2016
(2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201612_cfpb_CFOUpdate-FY16Q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZFR-T38K]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
CFO UPDATE FOR THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201712_cfpb_CFOUpdate-FY2017Q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/47KF-2LD2].
62. Compare CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018–2022
(Feb.
12,
2018),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_strategicplan_fy2018-fy2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3ZT-VP64] with CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
PROTECTION BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2013–FY 2017 (Apr. 2013),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/strategic-plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E54U-X3LM].
63. The Acting Director requested that:
Congress make four changes to the law to establish meaningful
accountability for the Bureau: (1) Fund the Bureau through Congressional
appropriations; (2) Require legislative approval of major Bureau rules; (3)
Ensure that the Director answers to the President in the exercise of
executive authority; and (4) Create an independent Inspector General for
the Bureau.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. PROTECTION BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BUREAU
OF
CONSUMER
FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
2
(2018),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_semi-annual-report_spring2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5EU-GL4G].
64. At a 2018 meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General, the
Acting Director announced that the Bureau “would be looking to the state regulators
and states attorney general for a lot more leadership when it comes to enforcement.”
Allison Schoenthal, Insight: A Shift in Regulation from the CFPB to the States,
Bloomberg BNA (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-shift-regulationn73014482021/ [https://perma.cc/V9L3-L377].
65. Enforcement
Actions,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/
[https://perma.cc/5JRE-H624].
Comparatively, the CFPB took twenty-three
enforcement actions between January 1 and August 15, 2017; in 2016, it took
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filed to address alleged unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices and
regulatory violations by four online lenders that had allegedly
collected debt not legally owed and failed to disclose the true cost of
credit. 66 Moreover, there have been additional reports of the
Bureau’s closing pending investigations, consistent with the Acting
Director’s more limited view of the agency’s role. 67
In sum, agencies across the federal government have curtailed their
efforts to detect and correct potential illegal behavior in a variety of
industries and under an array of laws. Such a retreat poses both
functional and theoretical problems for our democracy. From a
functional perspective, it means fewer people have recourse when an
employer, lender, or landlord harms them, even when that harm
violates existing law. From a theoretical perspective, the net effect of
the federal government’s inaction is that laws duly passed by
Congress as representatives of the People have decreased in force and
effect. This erodes the legitimacy of our representative government.
C.

Other Enforcers Are Restricted: Inability of Private Plaintiffs to
Effectively Vindicate Their Own Rights

As explained in Part I.B, the federal government is currently on the
sidelines when it comes to rights enforcement. 68 If the federal
government was but one of many actors in the enforcement
landscape, the effect of its inaction would be limited. However, the
seventeen actions during that same period, and in 2015, it took thirty-seven. Id.; see
also Alan S. Kaplinsky, How Long Can Mick Mulvaney Serve as CFPB Acting
Director?, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 27, 2018),

https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/02/27/how-long-can-mick-mulvaneyserve-as-cfpb-acting-director/ [https://perma.cc/KZX3-MK6A] (observing that
Mulvaney’s appointment as Acting Director became effective on November 25,
2017); Kate Berry, CFPB’s Mulvaney Looks to Rein in ‘Tyranny’ of Agency He
Runs, AM. BANKER (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbsmulvaney-looks-to-rein-in-tyranny-of-agency-he-runs?feed=00000158-babc-dda9adfa-fefef5720000 [https://perma.cc/JN8Q-SCRM] (noting that by April 2018,
Mulvaney had already dropped six actions against payday lenders).
66. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), CFPB v.
Golden Valley Lending, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-02521 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2017); Complaint
for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, CFPB v. Golden Valley Lending, Inc.,
No. 17-cv-3155 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2017).
67. “Since the Trump administration took over the CFPB in November, the
bureau temporarily froze new regulations and instituted a review of enforcement
activities under acting director Mick Mulvaney, a longtime critic of the agency. The
CFPB hasn’t filed any new enforcement actions since November.” Yuka Hayashi,
States Target Consumer Issues as Federal Oversight Eases, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-target-consumer-issues-as-federaloversight-eases-1522920601 [https://perma.cc/T4SM-2M5B].
68. See supra Section I.B.
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alternative enforcers — private plaintiffs — are increasingly
restrained in their ability to vindicate their own rights as a result of
evolutions in the law on class action lawsuits. This Part discusses the
compounding challenge of limited private enforcement that, together
with decreased federal enforcement, further widen the gap between
law and reality.
Class actions, permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
allow individuals who are victims of fraud or discrimination to pursue
legal claims as a group when they have each experienced similar
harms. 69 The use of class actions as a tool for private enforcement of
public laws has a long history in our legal system. 70 Despite criticism
for misuse, class actions are widely recognized as an important tool
for individual plaintiffs to seek redress for harms that may not be
feasible to litigate on their own. 71 Consumer advocates in particular
favor the ability of would-be plaintiffs to pursue class actions. 72 Class
actions correct for what can otherwise be an insurmountable
imbalance between an individual’s relatively small harm and a
corporation’s outsized illegal gains across a large population of
consumers. 73 For example, if a company denies overtime to 10,000
workers with an average lost wage of $500 per worker, the cost of
litigating each individual case would dwarf the harm suffered by each
worker, despite a sizeable total harm of $5,000,000.

69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see also generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
70. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 624–27.
71. Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60
U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 770–71 (2012) (“Class actions are admittedly controversial,
viewed by some businesses as ‘legalized blackmail,’ yet also regarded as serving an
important public function allowing ‘those who are less powerful to band together –
using lawyers as their champions’ – to seek redress of grievances that would ‘go
unremedied if each litigant had to fight alone.’”) (internal citation omitted); see also
Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1714 (2006) (“Despite
perceived shortcomings and criticisms of misuse, class actions are an important
procedural joinder device in our public justice system for bringing claims on behalf of
a large number of individuals when it may be economically unfeasible to assert claims
individually.”) [hereinafter Universes Colliding].
72. “Without class actions, it is often infeasible for a consumer to hire a lawyer to
pursue a claim for a small dollar amount. Class actions also enable courts to assess
and remedy the full scope of a company’s wrongdoing.” Class Actions & Access to
Justice, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR, https://www.nclc.org/issues/arbitration-classactions.html [https://perma.cc/6JM5-E6Z8].
73. Id.
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Even with the documented benefits of class actions as both a
deterrent to 74 and a remedy for illegal conduct, the road to bringing a
class action to address widespread misconduct is steadily more
treacherous. 75 Consumer advocates bemoan the limitations of
contracts that require adjudication of consumer claims through
arbitration, particularly when the contract specifies that the
arbitration must be pursued individually, rather than on a class
basis. 76 These so-called “forced arbitration” clauses keep consumers
and employees from reaching a courtroom. 77 Additionally, they limit
the arbitrator’s ability to understand the full extent of a company’s
illegal behavior, because the case cannot be presented on behalf of
the full class of harmed victims. 78
The Supreme Court has erected even more onerous barriers to
many plaintiffs’ ability to seek justice through the court system. In
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 79 the Court clarified and tightened
the scope of Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, explaining
that “proof of commonality necessarily overlap[ped] with
respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engage[d] in a pattern

74. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing?, in THE CLASS
ACTION EFFECT 180–203 (Catherine Piché ed., 2018) (evaluating critiques of class
actions and concluding that “the conventional view that the class action can be
justified by the deterrence rationale alone remains sound”); see generally Russell M.
Gold, Compensation’s Role in Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997 (2016)
(arguing that individual victim compensation increases the deterrent effects of class
actions).
75. Weston, Universes Colliding, supra note 71, at 1714–15 (observing a “trend in
corporate America to require the submission of disputes to private arbitration rather
than to courts of law via predispute arbitration provisions in a range of contracts
involving consumer, employment, health care, and business transactions” and noting
that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) further restricts judicial class
actions by prohibiting litigants from filing judicial class actions involving national
claims in state courts).
76. See, e.g., Richard Cordray, Opinion, Let Consumers Sue Companies, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/let-consumerssue-companies.html [https://nyti.ms/2vjWRyP]; see also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing

Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an
Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 132 (1997).
77. Forced
Arbitration,
NAT’L
CONSUMER
L.
CTR,

https://www.nclc.org/issues/forced-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/K3QJ-8DDW].
78. Id. (“Forced arbitration clauses are found in fine print in contracts for bank
accounts, student loans, cell phones, employment, nursing homes and more. These
clauses deprive people of their day in court when a company violates the law, forcing
victims into a system that is often biased, secretive and lawless. Forced arbitration
clauses often contain class action bans that prevent either a judge or an arbitrator
from seeing or addressing the full extent of a company’s wrongdoing.”).
79. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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or practice of discrimination.” 80 The Court held that the employees’

statistical and testimonial evidence of employment discrimination did
not provide sufficient proof that they suffered the same injury or that
their Title VII claims depended on answers to common questions.81
Just months earlier, the Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion 82 held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state
law prohibiting class-action waivers in arbitration agreements. 83 It
thus barred the plaintiff consumers in this case from pursuing a class
complaint in federal court against AT&T and instead required them
to proceed through arbitration on an individual basis. 84 And in May
2018, in its 5-4 decision in Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, the
court held that employers can contractually forbid workers from
arbitrating legal disputes as a class. 85
Taken together, Wal-Mart, Concepcion, and Epic Systems raise the
barriers to entry for class certification in every federal class action
matter and allow potential defendants to insulate themselves from
class-action lawsuits or class arbitrations by drafting their contracts to
prohibit such a remedy. In the wake of Wal-Mart and Concepcion,
scholars and practitioners alike have identified challenges for putative
plaintiffs attempting class certification or proceeding to vindicate
their rights as a class even if they meet the more stringent
requirements for certification. 86 Having to satisfy the Wal-Mart
commonality requirement makes it much harder for plaintiffs to
address widespread harm, particularly when defendants are
increasingly large corporations. 87 Paradoxically, the greater and more

80. See id. at 352.
81. See id. at 356.
82. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
83. “Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA.” Id. at 343.
84. See id. at 352.
85. 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
86. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Opinion, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action
Suits,
SFGATE
(Nov.
7,
2010,
4:00
AM),
https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Supreme-Court-case-could-end-class-actionsuits-3246898.php [https://perma.cc/33QS-AWEZ]; see also Forced Arbitration, supra
note 77.
87. Sarah Kellogg, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, WASH. LAWYER (Sept. 2011),
https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washingtonlawyer/articles/september-2011-walmart-dukes.cfm
[https://perma.cc/SB76-6RMQ]
(“While the Dukes decision won’t eliminate all class action lawsuits, it will severely
curtail similar employment discrimination cases, and will most certainly impact the
presentation and success rates of class actions for securities cases and mass torts. By
handing defendants the ammunition, they need to effectively slay mega–classes, the
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widespread the harm, the more difficult it is to obtain relief and
accountability for that harm. And Wal-Mart requires plaintiffs
seeking injunctive relief to present — and courts to assess — the
merits of their case at the class certification stage, effectively making
cases harder and more expensive to initiate. 88 These hurdles,
combined with the acceptability of class waivers under Concepcion,
mean that individual plaintiffs and their representatives have far
fewer options for vindicating their rights than they once did. 89 Each
of these barriers benefit large corporations at the expense of
individual consumers and workers, regardless of the legal merits of
their claims.
Notably, the other branches of the current federal government
have joined the federal judiciary in signaling support for the move
toward permitting mandatory arbitration and class waivers. In late
2017, for example, pursuant to the Congressional Review Act,
Congress passed and the President signed a joint resolution
disapproving the final rule published by the CFPB that would have
limited companies’ ability to use mandatory arbitration clauses and to
bar consumers from participating in class action lawsuits. 90

Court has seriously undermined the class action lawsuit today and in the future.”).
See also Marcia L. McCormick, Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the
Future of Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV.
711, 728 (2013) (“In procedural terms, the dissimilarities approach, which is now a
part of the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality inquiry, will prove an especially high hurdle in
cases that present facts that conflict with judges’ worldview. It was evident in this
case, as it has been in many other employment discrimination cases at every level of
court, that the majority of judges do not believe that employment discrimination
occurs very often. And it was this worldview that prompted the majority to find the
claims of commonality essentially implausible. For other legal wrongs that courts
find unlikely to occur, like the antitrust claim in Twombly and the civil rights claim in
Iqbal, the chances of framing a successful class action seem very slim.”).
88. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 658–59 (noting that “[c]lass actions are
on the ropes” in part because of the “development of a standard under which
plaintiffs are required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence – just as they
would at trial – any fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23, even if it also
goes to the merits. This requirement is at its most potent in damages cases under
Rule 23(b)(3), where plaintiffs are obligated to establish the predominance of
common issues. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v
Dukes, meanwhile, largely carries these heightened requirements over into the
injunctive realm, by redefining the hitherto easy-to-satisfy commonality requirement
of Rule 23(a)(2).”).
89. Id. at 660 (“All of this, coupled with the Supreme Court’s embrace of class
action waivers, radically restricts the continued ability of private actors to vindicate
public rights via the class action mechanism.”).
90. See generally Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 55500 (Nov. 22, 2017)
(CRA
revocation),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/11/22/201725324/arbitration-agreements [https://perma.cc/6JKQ-RPK8]; see also CONSUMER
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While the full impact of these decisions may not yet be realized, 91
scholars and practitioners predict lasting and destructive ripple effects
on the ability of individuals to enforce their own rights. According to
the CFPB’s 2015 Arbitration Study, tens of millions of consumers use
consumer financial products or services that are subject to pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. 92 And nearly all of the arbitration clauses the
CFPB studied contained prohibitions on proceeding as a class. 93
Scholars highlight the improbability of consumers pursuing
This analysis is consistent with how
individual arbitrations. 94
consumers predict their own behavior even when faced with being
scammed or defrauded. When the CFPB asked consumers how they
would respond to being assessed erroneous credit card fees, they
learned that consumers seldom even contemplate bringing formal
claims in any forum — litigation or arbitration — even when such
avenues as customer service have proven unavailing. 95
These trends have already had an impact in the courts. In the wake
of Wal-Mart, courts have denied class certifications in matters
involving, for instance, violations of constitutional rights by city police
departments and insufficient wage payments. 96 Further, consistent
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies from Using
Arbitration Clauses to Deny Groups of People Their Day in Court (July 10, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-bancompanies-using-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-people-their-day-court/
[https://perma.cc/3WUK-FD6M].
91. In its 2015 Arbitration Study, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
found an upward trend in the use of arbitration clauses post-Concepcion, but noted
that the increase was not as dramatic as predicted by some commentators. See
CONUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU:
STUDY
§
2
at
12
(Mar.
2015),
ARBITRATION
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/63KZ-J3CS]; see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at
n.166 (citing studies showing a decline in class certification in the years 2009 to 2012).
92. See generally CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: ARBITRATION
STUDY, supra note 91.
93. Id. § 1 at 10 (“Across each product market included in the study, 85–100% of
the contracts with arbitration clauses . . . include such no-class arbitration provisions.
Although these terms effectively preclude all class proceedings, in court or in
arbitration, some arbitration clauses also expressly waive the consumer’s ability to
participate in class actions in court.”).
94. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 633–34.
95. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: ARBITRATION STUDY, supra
note 92, at §1 at 11.
96. Haus v. City of New York, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155735, at *292–95
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011) (denying class certification because seventeen plaintiffs
seeking relief for violations of their constitutional rights had not met the
requirements of Rule 23, including the commonality requirements as clarified by
Wal-Mart); St. Pierre v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., No. 4:13-CV-13202-TSH, 2016 U.S. Dist.
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with the Concepcion Court’s acknowledgment that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) “reflect[s] both a ‘liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration,’ and the ‘fundamental principle that arbitration
is a matter of contract,’” 97 courts routinely find arbitration clauses
enforceable. 98 Courts have also followed Concepcion’s holding that a
state “cannot require a procedure [like class arbitration] that is
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated
reasons” 99 in granting motions to compel arbitration in matters
related to, for example, price fixing, 100 failure to pay wages, 101 and the
purchase of cell phone services. 102 The Supreme Court relied on
Concepcion in its Epic Systems decision to expand its core holding to

LEXIS 18492, at *12 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2016) (denying class certification in a matter
related to employer compensation because plaintiffs had not met their burden under
Wal-Mart “to demonstrate the nature of their alleged injury and to show that other
members of the class suffered the same harm.”). But see Langendorf v. Skinnygirl
Cocktails LLC, No. 11 CV 7060, 306 F.R.D. 574, at *580–81 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2014)
(applying Wal-Mart and finding that the commonality requirement of Rule 23 was
satisfied, but declining to certify the class based on inadequacy of representation).
97. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (internal citations
omitted).
98. See generally Ribeiro v. Sedgwick LLP, No. C 16-04507 WHA, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 152896 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (granting defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration based on the signed arbitration agreement in a putative class action
alleging gender-based pay and promotion discrimination); see Meyer v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2017) (applying the FAA and state contract law to
grant defendant Uber’s motion to compel arbitration in putative class action where
the arbitration provision was “reasonably conspicuous” to the plaintiff, and that he
had “unambiguously manifested his assent” to be bound by the contract’s terms of
service).
99. 563 U.S. at 351.
100. In re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litig., 953 F. Supp.
2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in
consolidated proceeding alleging price fixing against online travel and hotel
companies and explaining that, according to Concepcion, a state “cannot require a
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated
reasons”).
101. Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (granting
defendant’s motion to compel individual arbitration in a putative class action seeking
redress for failure to pay wages owed to employees upon termination because
defendant had not waived its right to seek arbitration, the arbitration agreement was
not unconscionable under state law, and, under Concepcion, requiring class
arbitration when an arbitration agreement precluded it was “inconsistent with the
FAA”).
102. Sidney v. Verizon Comm., No. 17 CV 1850 (RJD)(RLM), 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48485, at *7–9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018) (granting defendant’s motion to
compel arbitration in putative class action arising out of fraudulent purchase of cell
phone and service on plaintiff’s account because, under Concepcion and related
precedent, the parties’ arbitration agreement and the class action waiver contained in
it were both enforceable).
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employment contracts, explaining that “courts may not allow a
contract defense to reshape traditional individualized arbitration by
mandating class-wide arbitration procedures without the parties’
consent.” 103
II. FIXING THE DESIGN FLAW: CITIES AS ENGINES OF JUSTICE
As Part I illuminates, two major enforcers – the federal
government and private plaintiffs – have been at least partially
removed from the enforcement landscape. 104 Federal retrenchment
and restriction of private enforcement only exacerbates an alreadypresent enforcement vacuum. 105 With enforcers at the federal level

103. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (“Just as judicial
antagonism toward arbitration before the Arbitration Act’s enactment ‘manifested
itself in a great variety of devices and formulas declaring arbitration against public
policy,’ Concepcion teaches that we must be alert to new devices and formulas that
would achieve much the same result today. And a rule seeking to declare
individualized arbitration proceedings off limits is, the Court held, just such a
device.”) (internal citations omitted).
104. See supra Part I.
105. See Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 918
(2014), http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/61-4-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9SV-TZ8W]
(“While enactment-enforcement gaps are widespread in criminal law, this
discrepancy is uniquely significant in the context of laws that are understood to ‘send
a message.’”); Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal
Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (“Prosecutors
with large caseloads lack the resources to take every case to trial.”); Cook County to

Stop Prosecuting Some Traffic Offenses Because It Lacks Resources, Foxx’s Office
CHI.
TRIB.
(June
15,
2017,
2:02
PM),
Says,

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-states-attorney-traffic-offenseprosecution-20170615-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y89F-C7BR]; Lisa Rein &
Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is Changing the Federal Bureaucracy, WASH.
POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-trump-era-ischanging-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859fb0995360725_story.html?utm_term=.255048a9146a [https://perma.cc/F3BC-FSMP]
(describing the “crippling” effect on enforcement from the large number of
supervisors who have left OSHA, because supervisors have to review potential
enforcement actions); Suzy Khim, EPA Enforcement Actions Hit 10-Year Low in
2017, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/whitehouse/epa-enforcement-actions-hit-10-year-low-2017-n846151
[https://perma.cc/3MAL-T6A7] (“The past fiscal year marked a historic low for
enforcement actions across the board: The number of new civil and criminal cases,
defendants charged, and federal EPA inspections and evaluations all reached their
lowest levels in at least a decade, according to the data.”); Eric Lipton & Danielle
Ivory, Under Trump, E.P.A. Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
10,
2017),
on
Enforcement
Officers,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-regulations.html
[https://nyti.ms/2jDgT4c]; Kathleen Majorsky, Enforcement Gap Reveals Difference
Between State Laws and Practices, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY: STATE
INTEGRITY 2012, https://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/08/20/18734/enforcement-gap-
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withdrawing and private plaintiffs increasingly powerless, state
attorneys general are working hard to fill this void, 106 but there is
significantly more to do.

reveals-difference-between-state-laws-and-practices [https://perma.cc/HV49-HLQ6];
Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local
Public Law Offices, reprinted in PAPERS FROM THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN
PUBLIC INTEREST COLLOQUIUM AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS:
FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, & PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 51, 52 (2008),
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/liman_whyTheLocalMatters.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VG3F-SR6T] (“[C]ities are often culturally indifferent (or even
resistant) to bringing affirmative cases even when they are not legally restrained from
undertaking such work.”); The Enforcement Gap: Federal Gun Laws Ignored,
FOR
GUN
SAFETY
FOUNDATION
1,
2
(2003),
AMERICANS
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/10/AGS_Report_-_The_Enforcement_Gap__Federal_Gun_Laws_Ignored.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3X7-EME7] (“There is a vast
enforcement gap between the level of federal gun crimes and the number of federal
prosecutions.”).
106. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp. & Navient Sol., LLC, No. 3:02-at06000
(M.D.
Penn.
filed
Oct.
5,
2017)
http://media.philly.com/documents/Pa.+v.+Navient.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8DN7Q7H]; Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, A.G.
Schneiderman Leads 11 Attorneys General Opposing Trump Dept. of Labor
Program to Offer Amnesty to Labor Law Violators (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-leads-11-attorneys-general-opposingtrump-dept-labor-program-offer [https://perma.cc/9K2E-ZNHN]; 3 Enforcement
Priorities for State AGs in 2018, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.foley.com/3-enforcement-priorities-for-state-ags-in-2018-01-08-2018/
[http://perma.cc/7H99-89WZ]; Rachel M. Cohen, The Hour of the Attorneys

General: State Democratic AGs Have Assumed New Importance in the Effort to
Contain the Trump Presidency, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 22, 2017),

http://prospect.org/article/hour-attorneys-general
[https://perma.cc/LX3K-59X7];
Lauren Dezenski, In Fight Against Trump, Democratic AGs Take a Page from GOP:

States Are Bringing a Growing String of Lawsuits, Complaints and Other Actions
Against the Trump Administration — and There’s No End in Sight, POLITICO (Feb.
7, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/07/democratic-attorneysgeneral-trump-393651 [https://perma.cc/P35S-VG4M]; Edward-Isaac Dovere, The

New AG Itching to Take on Trump: New Jersey Attorney General Gurbir Grewal
Has Jurisdiction over 20 Trump Properties and Is Ready to Step into Eric
POLITICO
(May
23,
2018,
5:03
AM),
Schneiderman’s
Void,

https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/23/new-jersey-attorney-general-trump-603284
[https://perma.cc/R7XW-7D7R]; Yuka Hayashi, States Target Consumer Issues as
Federal Oversight Eases, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2018, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-target-consumer-issues-as-federal-oversighteases-1522920601
[https://perma.cc/KZH7-VGGB];
Barbara
S.
Mishkin,
Pennsylvania AG Creates Consumer Financial Protection Unit, BALLARD SPAHR
LLP:
CONSUMER
FIN.
MONITOR
(July
14,
2017),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2017/07/24/pennsylvania-ag-createsconsumer-financial-protection-unit/
[https://perma.cc/H32Q-MUP6];
Gregory
Roberts, States Standing By to Fill ‘Imminent’ CFPB Enforcement Gap,
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/states-standing-filln73014452991/ [https://perma.cc/93VS-JR74].
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The precarious state of rights enforcement in the United States
today exposes a serious design flaw in our system. Reliance on only
one level of government to protect our most basic rights subjects the
fate of those rights to the unpredictable results of single elections.
Our system allows an electoral pendulum swing to significantly
impact the protection of our core rights. This is a flaw requiring
repair. A more effective system would guard against the de facto
nullification of protections we have already agreed upon as a society
because there are not enough proverbial “cops on the beat.”
Cities have the ability to file affirmative litigation to protect public
rights and address illegal behavior, and thus are an important solution
to this design flaw. Not only are cities a solution to address underenforcement of public rights, but also, they have a permanent role to
play in advancing their residents’ rights and the national conversation
on critical issues.
This Part discusses the value of redundancy for effective, ongoing
rights enforcement and how cities, through their ability to file
affirmative cases to address harms to their communities, are key to
establishing a desirable rights enforcement framework. It also
addresses the role cities play in diversifying our system of rights
enforcement by virtue of the unique position they inhabit. As the
closest representatives to their communities, cities take the final step
of policymaking when they enforce existing laws. And, in so doing,
they fulfill their role as representatives of their communities. Finally,
cities have the unique ability to push forward social progress in ways
consistent with the will of the People at the most local level.
A. Multiple Enforcers Are Desirable to Protect Public Rights
The examples described in this Article make clear that we as a
society need enforcers at multiple levels of government focusing on
civil rights, environmental protections, and consumer laws. Our
society and the problems we face have become sufficiently complex
that we need both policymaking and enforcement to happen at all
levels of government. 107 In this section, we argue for redundancy of
civil enforcement functions.

107. Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in
an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 510 (2010)

(“Immigration, climate change, labor standards, and the economic crisis are highprofile examples of the fact that it is no longer possible — nor is it desirable — to
think, decide, and implement rules and policies only at the federal level or at the state
level or at the local level; rather, it has become necessary to govern them at many
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Cities are largely untapped resources that are well positioned to
step in to protect our public rights through their ability to file
affirmative litigation. 108 This work by cities is more critical now than
ever. The current federal climate makes abundantly clear the
importance of redundancy by design: multiple enforcers with
authority to ensure that protections enshrined in law convert to real
protections on the ground. Just as hospitals have multiple generators
to hedge against a single point of failure, so should our democracy
feature multiple options to enforce our legal and constitutional rights.
Or to use a more modern example, this recommendation is not unlike
applying the theory behind blockchain to our democratic system. Just
as blockchain stores information over a distributed network so that
no central repository can corrupt the data, 109 so too do we propose
empowering a diversity of enforcers across all levels of government
such that inaction at one level cannot remove all enforcement activity
from the legal marketplace.
What is easy to forget in the tumult of the current federal
administration is that the need for redundancy is not a short-term
problem or a phenomenon confined to a particular administration.110
While the current administration’s lack of commitment to enforcing
core civil rights, economic, and environmental protection laws is
extreme, the inherent design flaw will persist beyond the conclusion
of the current federal administration.
Even when the federal government prioritizes enforcing the public
rights laws within its jurisdiction, there are matters that federal
enforcement agencies do not address because of resource
constraints. 111 Every office has to make strategic decisions about how
to use its resources. The reality is that enforcement actions and
affirmative litigation takes significant effort from any agency. 112 Even

levels of government — sub-national, national, and supra-national —
simultaneously.”).
108. See Morris, supra note 25, at 201.
109. See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH
SYSTEM 8 (2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQB3-P5UJ].
110. See Wolf Heydebrand, Government Litigation and National Policymaking:
From Roosevelt to Reagan, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 477, 477 (1990) (analyzing litigation
trends administration over administration and noting that “[t]here is some evidence
of systematic variation in government litigation and administrative appeals due to an
‘administration effect’ but there are also secular tendencies suggesting a more general
‘government’ effect cutting across various administrations”).
111. See, e.g., Krauss, supra note 105, at 8.
112. See, e.g., Charlotte Corley, Will States Fill the CFPB Enforcement Void?,
BANKER:
BANK
THINK
(June
15,
2018,
9:57
AM),
AM.
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/will-states-fill-the-cfpb-enforcement-void
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in times of aggressive enforcement activity, there is more illegal
behavior than there are resources among enforcers. 113 Under the
Obama administration, for example, the federal government could
not investigate all the police departments in need of reform, nor could
it protect consumers from all predatory businesses, despite an
articulated desire to root out police abuses and predatory lending.114
To effectively address the current crisis and to more effectively
preserve our rights in the future, we need to diversify our portfolio of
civil, economic, and environmental rights investment across the
country. Effective enforcement requires cities to be in the mix of
enforcers. If we solve for this design flaw now, we protect ourselves
against the next time factors — such as those described in Part I —
combine to threaten our public rights. In effect, a diversified
enforcement portfolio provides a hedge against future threats in any
one level of government.
While this recommendation might read as a call for purely
redundant enforcement functions, that is not our suggestion. Rather,
each government office can and should pursue complementary
enforcement, consistent with their varied statutory authorities and
jurisdictional constraints, and coordinating where necessary and

[https://perma.cc/H6UR-QBS2] (Charlotte Corley, chair of the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors and commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Banking and
Consumer Finance, reflects on the significant time and resources required to pursue
consumer protection cases and explains that it is essential to have multiple state
regulatory bodies focused on consumer compliance.).
113. See, e.g., Krauss, supra note 105, at 8 (“Prosecutors with large caseloads lack
the resources to take every case to trial.”); Dara Lind, The
Government Can’t Enforce Every Law. Who Gets to Decide Which Ones It Does?,
(Mar.
31,
2015,
8:00
AM),
VOX
https://www.vox.com/2015/3/31/8306311/prosecutorial-discretion
[https://perma.cc/LMW8-53R6] (“[T]he government has limited resources, and
discretion is the way it makes decisions about how to spend them.”).
114. See generally Press Release, DOJ, Attorney General Holder Announces
President Obama’s Budget Proposes $173 Million for Criminal Justice Reform (Mar.
4,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announcespresident-obama-s-budget-proposes-173-million-criminal [https://perma.cc/YWW4TD8D]; Press Release Number, U.S. DOJ, Justice Department Announces More
Than $130 Million in Cost Saving and Efficiency Measures to Utilize Resources More
Effectively (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentannounces-more-130-million-cost-saving-and-efficiency-measures-utilize
[https://perma.cc/752G-WPS5]; Richard Cordray, Partnering: The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and State Attorneys General, CONSUMER FINANCE
(Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/partnering-theconsumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-state-attorneys-general/
[https://perma.cc/NU78-FF2T] (discussing the need for the federal government to
work together with state enforcers “because we can be more effective and efficient by
working with you to police the financial marketplace”).
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efficient. This robust system of rights enforcement could withstand
fluctuations in the resources and activity of any one enforcer.
B.

Cities Play a Role Distinct from Other Levels of Government

Affirmative litigation by cities offers unique advantages to
communities across the country that cannot be fully addressed by
other levels of government. 115 Rights enforcement by cities is
particularly essential now, but it will always be necessary. While city
affirmative litigation can and should complement enforcement work
done by other government actors, it is not purely redundant with
those functions. This section describes diversification as an essential
companion to redundancy in an effective system of rights
enforcement.

1.

Cities Are the Closest Representatives of Their Communities

City affirmative litigation furthers at least two distinct functions of
government: it is critical for successful policy making at the local level
and it fulfills cities’ democratic imperative, bolstering their moral
legitimacy as representatives and guardians of their constituents’
interests. Additionally, city affirmative litigation can provide the city
and its residents compensation for injuries, outstanding debts,
penalties, and the cost of litigation.
Under the first function, city-level enforcement is justified as an
extension of a city’s policymaking authority. Without enforcement,
laws enacted at the local level or that localities have the ability to
enforce will not be fully effectuated. 116 As scholar Sarah L. Swan
argues, “[t]he turn to litigation as a solution . . . is not an affront to
democracy.” 117 Rather, litigation is not inherently less democratic
than regulation: our system of political and legal governance is set up
to rely on litigation as a mode of governing; the choice to settle any
particular litigated matter is up to individual defendants; and, perhaps
most importantly as it relates to this Article, “the lever that creates
the possibility of litigation functioning as regulation is a violation of
existing law.” 118 When properly viewed as part of the policymaking
lifecycle, law enforcement by municipalities is a natural — and
essential — part of the democratic process.

115.
116.
117.
118.

See infra Section II.B.1.
See supra note 15.
Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1270 (2018).
Id. at 1270–71.
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Under the second function, taking action to protect members of a
local community is consistent with a city’s representational
function. 119 As compared to other plaintiffs, cities have a strong basis
from which to pursue affirmative litigation and are able to vindicate
the public interest in a way that private plaintiffs cannot. 120 As the
closest representatives of their constituencies, city governments are
also often in the best position to understand the needs of their
communities. City offices may be more likely to take up issues
important to their residents than representatives at higher levels of
In addition, because city officials represent a
government. 121
different slice of the electorate than a state or federal official, their
view of constituents’ priorities and needs may vary dramatically from
the conclusions of officials at other levels of government. 122 Thus, a
diversified set of enforcers leads to a diversified set of enforcement
priorities. For example, a large, densely-populated city in an
otherwise rural state may have strong reasons to prioritize housing
code violations due to the public health and economic implications of
housing noncompliance for the city. By contrast, state enforcers
might focus on farm workers’ rights or other issues impacting
statewide populations. Neither set of priorities is more or less
legitimate; both represent the interests of the constituents served by
their respective representatives.
City affirmative litigation can also support municipalities from a
fiscal perspective. It will allow them to recoup their own costs as well
as recover money for their communities through penalties assessed
for illegal behavior or through actions aimed at recovering funds that
were illegally withheld from the city or its residents. 123 These actions
119. “Attorneys general may not be driven by the pursuit of attorney’s fees, but
their status as political representatives means that they must balance the interests of
the public at large with those of the individuals they purport to represent in an
adjudicative capacity.” Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public:
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 487 (2012).
120. Swan, supra note 117, at 1244 (observing that, in tobacco litigation, “changing
the plaintiff changed how the harm was understood. Rather than being understood as
the result of individual choices for which individuals should bear the cost, plaintiff
city claims are reframed as harms to the public, which are the result of third-party
wrongdoing, and for which, accordingly, those third-party wrongdoers should bear
the cost”).
121. See Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 59, 86 (2014) (arguing for associational standing for cities and suggesting that
cities may take a stronger interest in local problems – and be able to achieve
consensus on those issues more readily – than state level enforcers).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, City of San Francisco v. Nevada, 2013 WL 5290245
(Cal. Super. 2013) (No. CGC-13-534108); Complaint at 1, City of New York v. FedEx
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can take the form of lawsuits that put money back in the pockets of
those who fell victim to predatory practices and penalize the bad
actor, 124 or money being returned to city coffers. 125 In both
situations, cities are able to vindicate the monetary interests of their
communities that have been harmed by illegal behavior. In this way,
cities see a return on investment for their affirmative litigation efforts
that would not exist if enforcement was left to state and federal
players.

Ground Package Sys. Inc., 2013 WL 6845792 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 CV 9173);
Press Release, N.Y. City Law Dep’t, City Announces Settlement with FedEx Ground
over
Cigarette
Deliveries
(Mar.
15,
2013),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/Fed-Ex%20Cigarette%20Settlement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H2CW-DYGW].
124. For example, in 2007, San Francisco sued Check ‘n Go and Money Mart for
making payday loans with annual percentage rates over 400, more than eleven times
the allowable interest rate in California. Press Release, Office of the City Attorney of
S.F., Herreras Payday Lender Case Nets 7.7 Million for Borrowers at Zero Expense
to Taxpayers (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2013/08/05/herreraspayday-lender-case-nets-7-7-million-for-borrowers-at-zero-expense-to-taxpayers/
[https://perma.cc/5DAZ-59FR]. The settlement ultimately reached in this matter
resulted in $7.7 million in restitution for harmed consumers. Id. In 2016, Los Angeles
settled a case with Wells Fargo bank related to the bank’s opening of accounts
without consumers’ consent or knowledge, causing consumers to incur unwanted fees
and other negative financial consequences. L.A. obtained a $50 million civil penalty,
which the city indicated would be devoted to future consumer protection. Press
Release, L.A. City Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles City Attorney Mike Feuer
Achieves Historic Result in Consumer Action Against Wells Fargo; Bank to Make
Restitution to Customers, Pay $50-million in Penalties; Unprecedented Coordination
with Federal Regulators to Benefit Consumers Nationwide (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://www.lacityattorney.org/single-post/2016/09/08/Los-Angeles-City-AttorneyMike-Feuer-Achieves-Historic-Result-in-Consumer-Action-Against-Wells-FargoBank-to-Make-Restitution-to-Customers-Pay-50-million-in-PenaltiesUnprecedented-Coordination-with-Federal-Regulators-to-Benefit-ConsumersNationwide [https://perma.cc/444U-3RJR].
125. For example, New York City has actively enforced tobacco and cigarette tax
laws in response to tobacco companies refusing to pay the city millions of dollars in
tax revenues that would have gone to city services and other vital expenses. Using
affirmative litigation, the city responded on several fronts. It filed a complaint stating
that FedEx “knowingly” transported, possessed, and distributed contraband
cigarettes and committed “racketeering acts” under the RICO statute. Complaint at
1, City of New York v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 2013 WL 6845792 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (No. 13 CV 9173). In 2013, FedEx agreed to pay $2.4 million to resolve part of
the city’s claim for delivering untaxed cigarettes. Press Release, N.Y. City Law Dep’t,
N.Y. City Announces Settlement with FedEx Ground Over Cigarette Deliveries
(Mar.
15,
2013),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/FedEx%20Cigarette%20Settlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2CW-DYGW].
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The Role of Cities in Advancing Social Progress

Cities can also be instruments of social progress, both through their
ability to instigate and lead national conversations on progressive
issues 126 and their ability to resist national trends that do not align
with their communities’ vision of justice. 127 These abilities are unique
to cities because their origin is the will of the populace at the local
level and further highlight the value of cities working in parallel to
other enforcers in a diversified system of public rights enforcement.
Just like states, cities should serve as laboratories of democracy.128
Affirmative litigation provides cities with one tool to both advance
issues important to their local communities and simultaneously
exercise national leadership on an issue by pushing its unique
perspective into the national consciousness and conversation. 129 The
San Francisco City Attorney’s efforts to fight for marriage equality
through the first government-initiated challenge to marriage laws that
discriminate against same-sex couples illustrate the influence a city
can have in both protecting the civil rights of its residents and in
contributing to the national dialogue, influencing the law’s
development on a national scale. 130 In its motion for intervention,
San Francisco articulated its unique interest in protecting the rights of
its residents and the unique harms it experienced as a city from the

126. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748
(2005) (discussing San Francisco’s decision to challenge prevailing norms by marrying
gay and lesbian couples).
127. Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1265–72 (2009).
128. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the
power to prevent an experiment.”).
129. See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, More Cities Suit Up for Legal Actions, WALL ST. J.
(May 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-cities-suit-up-for-legal-actions1462218870 [https://perma.cc/59XR-957J]; Affirmative Litigation, CITY ATT’Y OF S.F.,
https://www.sfcityattorney.org/aboutus/teams/affirmative-litigation/
[https://perma.cc/2N6E-VFRS]. See generally Affirmative Litigation, PROVIDENCE
CITY SOLICITOR, http://www.providenceri.gov/law-department/affirmative-litigation/
[https://perma.cc/6CR2-ZZRA].
130. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Press Release, Office
of the City Att’y of S.F, San Francisco’s Legal Fight for Marriage Equality (Feb. 12,
2004),
https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2004/02/12/san-franciscos-legal-fight-formarriage-equality/ [https://perma.cc/7BPJ-24GT]; Scott L. Cummings & Douglas
NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1282–83 (2010).
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denial of those rights. 131 San Francisco argued that, as the local
government entity responsible for enforcing California’s
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriages against its
LGBT citizens, it had a significant and unique interest in the
action. 132 Specifically, the city articulated “not only a financial
interest in licensing and performing marriages of same-sex couples
and in the tax revenues that flow from weddings held in the City, but
also . . . an interest in preventing social, mental health, and other
harms suffered by its LGBT citizens.” 133
Cities can also stake out a position adverse to that adopted by the
federal or state government in a way that gives voice to the will of
City affirmative litigation has been a
their constituencies. 134
significant tool in the “resistance” movement against actions — and
inactions — of the current administration for exactly this reason. 135
Cities have articulated and advocated in court for positions that
represent their residents and are at odds with state or national
policy. 136 Sanctuary city policies and the recent litigation surrounding
them is an example of this dynamic in play. 137 Cities have argued that
their duties to protect public safety require them to build
relationships of trust with local communities, and that federal

131. See Press Release, City Att’y Dennis Herrera, S.F. Moves to Intervene in
Federal
Challenge
to
Proposition
8
(July
23,
2009),
https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/PROP8-USDISTINTERVENTION.pdf [https://perma.cc/93UZ-HP2B]; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921, 926, 928–30 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1065–66
(9th Cir. 2012).
132. Press Release, City Att’y Dennis Herrera, S.F. Moves to Intervene in Federal
Challenge to Proposition 8 (July 23, 2009), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/07/PROP8-USDIST-INTERVENTION.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PH9E-QAG2].
133. Id.
134. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748
(2005).
135. See generally Complaint, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 315 F. Supp.
3d 766 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-02921) (involving cities of New York, San
Francisco, Chicago, Providence, Philadelphia, and Seattle). Complaint, City &
County of San Francisco v. Sessions, No. 3:17-cv-04642 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 11,
2017).
136. See supra note 135; Press Release, City Attorney of S.F., Herrera moves to
invalidate Department of Justice grant conditions targeting sanctuary cities (July 12,
2018),
https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2018/07/12/herrera-moves-to-invalidatedepartment-of-justice-grant-conditions-targeting-sanctuary-cities
[https://perma.cc/8JAA-H6BV].
137. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 175 (5th Cir. 2018).
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immigration enforcement by local officials undermines the safety of
all residents, regardless of their citizenship or documentation. 138
Taken together, cities can effectuate the will of their constituents
both as a reaction against other levels of government and as a
proactive means of leading an issue that does not yet have a
champion. In both cases, cities can act legitimately as representatives
of their communities, vindicating the rights and interests of their
residents that have either been ignored or attacked by other officials.
Just as local legislation and executive decision-making can be
legitimate exercises in cooperative or uncooperative federalism, so
too is affirmative litigation and enforcement by cities an extension of
those representational roles. 139
In this way, local enforcement activity can be both a safety valve —
a redundant feature that guards against a single point of failure at
another level of government — and a diversification feature — a
unique opportunity for new and different actions than might
otherwise be pursued at the state or federal levels. Unlike the
example of the hospital back-up generator, there is no single designer
responsible for the design flaw we have identified in our current
system. From federal and state policymakers enacting legislation that
limits the authorities of local law enforcement, to federal courts
progressively circumscribing the role of private plaintiffs, to city

138. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Cty. of Santa Clara et al. in Support of the
City of Philadelphia’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9, City of Philadelphia v.
Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 271 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 2:17-cv-03894-MMB) (“In
exercising its discretion over local law enforcement policy, Philadelphia has made the
considered judgment that devoting local resources to immigration enforcement
would be detrimental to community safety. Philadelphia is not alone in this judgment.
More than 600 counties and numerous cities — including many of the amici — have
opted to limit their engagement in federal immigration enforcement efforts.”)
(internal citations omitted)); see also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, City of
Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-cv-05720) (“The 2012
[Welcoming City Ordinance] reaffirmed that removing barriers to ‘the cooperation of
all persons, both documented citizens and those without documentation status,’ with
law enforcement was ‘essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public
order, safety, and security in the entire City.’”) (internal citations omitted).
139. We acknowledge that cities have the ability to use these tools to advance all
types of policies, not just those of a progressive minority. That is, after all, the nature
of a representative democracy. We believe the interests of our communities will be
best served, however, if enforcers at multiple levels of government are considering
the rights of their communities. The more enforcers on the scene, the fewer points of
failure will exist overall. Moreover, each government office is limited in its actions by
the constitution and by federal, state, and local law. So, our recommendation for
redundancy and diversification should insulate our communities from extreme
electoral shifts at any one level of government even while shifts will inevitably
happen in varying degrees over time.
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officials having to make hard choices about whether to expend
resources of affirmative work, the causes are complex and varied. As
a result, some cities may encounter barriers to pursuing affirmative
litigation, including new state preemption laws and longstanding
jurisprudence limiting the power of cities. A full realization of city
power would require significant changes throughout our legal and
political system. Notwithstanding these obstacles, cities have the
power to act now, using the powers already available to them and
within the existing legal framework. They can provide redundancy
and diversification of rights enforcement immediately, by using their
existing tools and authorities.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a discussion of design flaws and avoidance
of single points of failure. Like the hospital dealing with downed
generators during a major hurricane, our democratic process suffers
from a design flaw when it comes to enforcement of our laws. The
laws on the books to protect our communities are insufficiently
enforced due to a confluence of factors: The current federal
administration has pulled back on its enforcement of key public rights
against a backdrop of already insufficient enforcement; the law
related to class-action lawsuits has been increasingly constricted; the
courts have increasingly accepted mandatory arbitration clauses; and
the class-action waivers frequently found in mandatory arbitration
clauses have limited the ability of individual plaintiffs to vindicate
their own rights without a government champion. Our system is not
currently designed to protect our communities’ public rights when
two of its key protectors – the federal government and private
plaintiffs – are handicapped.
The result of this design flaw is two-fold: from a functional
perspective, it means that people experience real-life harm that goes
unaddressed; from a theoretical perspective, it undermines the
legitimacy of our democratic institutions when society’s laws lack
real-life protective effect. This Article advocated for a system with
built-in redundancy and diversification by design, in which every level
of government is ready and able to enforce our core rights and
freedoms.
Affirmative litigation by cities — in addition to
engagement by states — is a critical component of this framework.
Cities should have the ability to be enforcers and protectors of their
communities by investigating legal violations and filing lawsuits.
Increasing affirmative litigation by cities is an important solution to
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the democratic design flaw that will help us move toward a more
effective system of ensuring our laws translate to reality.

